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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-LIEN FOR SEvcEs-PROcEEDINGs.-Judgment
having been given for the plaintiff's client, the defendant in the action
paid the amount of the judgment into court, because the plaintiff (who was
the successful party's attorney) had not released his lien thereon. The
plaintiff then filed a motion in which he asked the court to ascertain and
determine the amount of the fee due him for his services, and to declare in
his favor a lien to the extent thereof upon the moneys paid into court in
satisfaction of the judgment. The plaintiff's client objected on the grounds
that this would deprive him (the client) of his right of trial by jury, and
would be a deprivation of his property without due process of law, con-
trary to Sec. 30, Art. 2 of the Constitution of Missouri. Held, it was proper
for the attorney to enforce his lien in this manner. State ex rel. Anderson
v. Roehrig (Mo. 1928), 8 S. W. (2d) 998.
The client could not have been deprived of a right to trial by jury. Sec.
690, R. S. Mo. 1919, which provides for an attorney's lien, prescribes that
the "Compensation of an attorney or counsellor for his services is governed
by an agreement expressed or implied, which is not restrained by law."
The attorney, then, could have enforced his lien by original suit in equity,
because Sec. 30, Art. 2 of the state constitution provides that "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
But it is not essential that proceedings should be according to the course of
the common law. Henning v. Stald (1897), 138 Mo. 430, 40 S. W. 95. The
summary proceeding by the plaintiff in the principal suit was sufficient,
since the relator of necessity had due notice of the proceeding.
Specific attorney's liens did not, strictly speaking, exist at common law,
because the element of possession necessary to ordinary liens was lacking.
Wright v. Cobleigh. (1850), 21 N. H. 339, 341; Young v. Renshaw (1903),
102 Mo. A. 173, 76 S. W. 701, 706. In the latter case the court said that
since the judgment obtained for the plaintiff's client was obtained before the
enactment of the law creating attorney's liens, "the plaintiff has no lien.
His only remedy is on the contract against his client." The attorney
always has had an equitable right to have his fees for services in a par-
ticular suit secured to him out of the judgment in that particular suit.
Filmore v. Wells (1887), 10 Colo. 228, 15 P. 343. The existence of the
lien was, however, recognized in several early English cases. welsh V.
Hoyle (1779), 1 Dougl. 238, 99 Reprint 155; Wilkins v. Carmichael (1779),
1 Dougl. 101, 99 Reprint 70. In the latter case Lord Mansfield said that
"Courts both of law and equity have now carried it so far that an attorney
may obtain an order to stop his client from receiving money recovered in a
suit in which he has been employed until his bill has been paid." But
nothing was said as to the proceeding necessary by the attorney to obtain
this order.
The modern rule is strictly in accord with the holding of the principal
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case as to the existence of an attorney's special lien. In some states the
lien exists by virtue of judicial decision, in others by virtue of statute.
Thayer v. Daniels (1873), 113 Mass. 129 and Central Railroad and Banking
Co. of Georgia v. Pettus (1884), 113 U. S. 116 exemplify the former type;
the Judiciary Law of New York, Secs. 474 and 475, typifies the statutory
lien. But as to the method of procedure there seems, however, to be some
confusion. The case of Prichard v. Fulmer (1916), 22 N. M. 134, 159 P. 39,
2 A. L. R. 474, in accord with the principal case on the method of procedure,
held that an attorney could not assert his lien in an independent suit, since
the court would afford ample remedy in the original suit. This seems to be
the better rule, and is illustrative of the trend of modern authority. See
Vaughan v. Hill (1922), 154 Ark. 528, 242 S. W. 826, and Epp v. Hinton
(1918), 102 Kan. 435, 170 P. 987, wherein the courts held that an applica-
tion to enforce an attorney's lien for services upon proceeds of a judg-
ment may be made in the case wherein judgment was rendered without
formal pleadings. The reasons for this rule, as pointed out in the cases,
are sound. Obviously, it prevents circuity of action since the attorney is
not required to bring another suit. The plaintiff's client cannot be de-
prived of his right of trial by jury in view of the fact that the issue is
equitable in its nature. Further, the plaintiff's client in every event has
notice of the proceedings against him, so as to enable him to prepare a
defense.
But the case of Weitzel v. Schmidt (1919), 178 N. Y. S. 429, held that the
amount of a lien is to be determined in a later appropriate proceeding,
rather than upon a motion filed by the attorney during the action in which
the judgment was given. This case is decided upon a strict interpretation
of the New York statutes providing for an attorney's lien and fails to
either recognize or account for the forceful and logical reasons supporting
the recognition of a summary proceeding for the enforcement of the at-
torney's lien. S. H., '30.
BIUZS AND NOTES-PRESENTMENT-SUFFICIENCY.-In presenting a prom-
issory note, a notary public, who was assistant teller of the bank holding
the note, called at the office of the maker to demand payment, took up the
matter with the party in charge of the office and stated to such party "I
have note here." Payment was refused. Held, there was a sufficient exhi-
bition of the note to comply with the Kansas Statutes. Toll v. Monitor
Bin ing and Printing Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1928), 26 F. (2d) 51.
There seems to be little doubt that the old rule of the common law was
that nothing short of actual exhibition would constitute sufficient present-
ment, in the absence of circumstances and conduct which would operate as
a waiver. Musson v. Lake (1846), 4 How. 262; Bank of Vergennes v.
Cameron (1849), 7 Barb. 143; Farmers' Bank v. Duvall (1835), 7 Gill, &
J. 78; Shaw v. Reed (1831), 12 Pick. 132; Waring v. Botts (1893), 90 Va.
46, 17 S. E. 739. Decisions which have excused actual presentment where
circumstances indicate a clear waiver on the part of the maker, are justified
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